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Today is an age of challenge. Values and practices that have
been accepted are now being questioned. Perhaps in no area has
this been so evident as in the production of consumer goods and
services. It was inevitable that this questioning would eventually
turn to many traditional legal practices, primarily focusing on the
cost of legal services for the consumer.' In response, the organized
bar has agreed, albeit reluctantly, to permit at least limited legal
advertising. 2 In a less organized response, enterprising individu-
als, both lawyers and laymen, have prepared and merchandised
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. Assistant
Dean, University of South Carolina School of Law. B.S., University of San Francisco,
1963; J.D., University of Georgia, 1971.
1. One clear example is the recent holding of the Supreme Court that minimum fee
schedules set by bar associations violate the antitrust laws. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
2. At its midyear meeting in February 1976, the American Bar Association's House
of Delegates approved revisions to the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY that
allow "brief biographical and other informative data" to be placed in the yellow pages of
telephone books, law lists, and legal directories. House Broadens Code's "Publicity in
General" Rules at Midyear Meeting in Philadelphia, 62 A.B.A.J. 470 (1976). This liberali-
zation was inadequate for some. Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A Good Beginning but Not
Enough, 62 A.B.A.J. 735 (1976). However, for others it was too much. See Views of Our
Readers, 62 A.B.A.J. 538, 548-50 (1976); Views of Our Readers, 62 A.B.A.J. 940, 946
(1976).
Indeed, the response to the Supreme Court's decision in Bates v. State Bar of Ari-
zona, 97 S.Ct. 1291 (1977), allowing at least limited advertising, indicates that many
lawyers need the competitive edge which advertising is perceived as providing. Legal
advertisements can be found in practically every newspaper. E.g., Los Angeles Times,
July 3, 1977, at 6, reprinted in Lawyers Venture into Advertising Era with Caution and
Questions, 63 A.B.A.J. 1064, 1064 (1977).
For a detailed analysis of advertising in the legal profession, see Student Project,
Attorney Advertising: Bates' Impact on Regulation, 29 S.C.L. REv. 457 (1978).
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do-it-yourself legal kits, which have found success in the market
place.3
The practice of probate has not escaped this critical scru-
tiny.4 Much of this criticism has been directed toward the admin-
istration and settlement of decedents' estates. Such criticism fo-
cuses on the claim that the process of probate is cumbersome,
self-serving, unnecessarily time consuming and overly expensive.5
The practicing bar might naturally claim that these com-
plaints are without foundation. Nevertheless, the public, or at
least a vocal and articulate part of the public, finds them merito-
rious.' So too have scholars, at least with respect to specific prob-
lems in their respective states.7 They perceive a jumble of state
laws often inconsistent, if not in actual conflict, with their coun-
terparts in other jurisdictions.' These writers detect what is at
3. No doubt the most famous of these are the tear-out forms provided in N. DACEY,
How TO AVOID PROBATE! (1965). In the forty-sixth printing of this book in 1976, the
publisher claims, on the cover, that over 970,000 copies have been sold. Do-it-yourself
divorce kits are also available in some localities. However, the legality of these kits is
dubious, at least in respect to their promoters. In Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683
(Fla. 1974), the marketing of do-it-yourself divorce kits was held to be engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law and enjoinable. Id. at 687. Similar lay advice for form serv-
ices has been enjoined in California and New York. State Bar v. Corey, No. 157,163
(Super. Ct. Cal., Oct. 11, 1973), reprinted in California Restrains "No-Fault Divorce
Consultation Service," 38 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS 44, 44-54 (1974); State v. Widner, No.
3789.72 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., June 29, 1972), reprinted in Burke, New York "Divorce Yourself"
Enjoined, 37 UNAutrH. PRAc. NEWS 22, 30-31 (1973). See generally Resh, More on Do-It-
Yourself Divorce Kits and Services, 37 UNAUTH. PRAc. NEWS 59 (1973).
4. E.g., Let's Rewrite the Probate Laws, CHANGING TIMES, Jan. 1969, at 39; Myers,
Probing the Sources of Probate Pains, Wall St. J., May 14, 1968, at 18, col. 3; Bloom, The
Mess in Our Probate Courts, READER'S DIGEST, Oct. 1966, at 102.
5. See M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE wrrH LAWYERS (1968). Professor Wellman describes
probate as reminding him of a Rube Goldberg contraption - doing things the hard way.
Wellman, Lawyers and the Uniform Probate Code, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 548, 550 (1973).
6. Obviously, a significant portion of the consuming public must agree with this
assertion, as the voluminous sales of N. DACEY, How To AVOID PROBATE! (1965) indicate.
See note 3 supra.
7. E.g., Basye, Are Probate Courts in Missouri Undergoing Retrogression?, 32 Mo.
L. REV. 175 (1967); Brennan, Probate Reform, 42 CONN. BAR J. 1 (1968); Chaffin,
Improving Georgia's Probate Code, 4 GA. L. REV. 505 (1970); Jones, Alabama Probate Law
- Need for Revision of Intestate Provisions, 20 ALA. L. REv. 1 (1967); Wellman, The
Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453 (1970);
Wellman, Uniform Probate Code: A National Necessity, 6 TmAL 22 (1970).
8. The requirement of notice to the heirs and other interested parties upon the open-
ing of an estate provides an illustration of the statement in the text. No such notice is
required in South Carolina, either prior to the admission of a will to probate in common
form or subsequent thereto. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976). Only if an heir or an
interested party requires probate in due form is notice required to be given. Id. § 21-7-
640. This lack of required notice is based on the assumption that interested parties would
2
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least an implicit attitude in state probate codes, that a detailed,
statutory supervision of probate is the only effective method of
protecting society, most principally creditors, from unscrupulous
heirs and beneficiaries? These critics justifiably question the ne-
cessity of these intricate procedures. They point to the fact that
succession to estates should be simple. Their contention is that
since most people are honest and do not need to be told to do what
they know must be done, the courts should stay out of probate
unless they are truly needed.
The Model Probate CodeI0 was the first national attempt to
approach these complex problems of probate in a systematic
know of the admittance of a will to probate in common form. However, the period for
requiring probate in due form, i.e., for contesting a will, is only six months after the
admission of the will to probate in common form. Id. Due to the ex parte nature of probate
in common form, it is possible that a potential contestant would remain ignorant of the
probate of the will until this six-month period has expired. Should such a situation arise,
the potential contestant has no remedy as the probate in common form remains valid. Id.
In contrast, the statutes of Ohio would not allow this situation to occur, at least in
regard to the decedent's relatives. Notice is required to be given to the surviving spouse
and to those persons who would be entitled to inherit from the testator had he died
intestate. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.13 (Page 1976). This difference as to the require-
ment of notice probably is due, in part, to the failure of Ohio to provide a procedure similar
to probate in common form. See id. §§ 2107.13-.18.
Georgia provides a third alternative. Georgia recognizes probate in common form as
well as probate in solemn or due form. GA. CODE ANN. § 113-601 (1975). Notice is not
required either prior to the admission of the will to probate or subsequent thereto. How-
ever, such a proceeding is not conclusive as to anyone whose interest in the estate is
adverse to the testamentary disposition of the estate as provided in the will. Id. Neverthe-
less, probate in common form becomes final and binding on all after seven years, without
exception. Id. § 113-605.
Thus, the notice provisions in Georgia do not differ significantly from the South
Carolina provisions. However, the lack of a notice requirement in Georgia is not as likely
to result in injustice as the conclusiveness of the proceeding in common form is defined
for a substantial period of time - seven years as compared to six months. Unfortunately,
in order to eliminate the potential for injustice, the Georgia provisions sacrifice certainty
as to the validity of the proceedings. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) [hereinafter
referred to as the UPC] would eliminate this problem. Under the terms of the UPC, the
personal representative must give heirs and devisees notice of his appointment. Id. § 3-
306. An interested party, under the UPC, may commence an action for formal probate,
the equivalent of probate in solemn form, within three years of the decedent's death or
within twelve months of the informal probate, the equivalent of probate in common form,
whichever is later. Id. § 3-108. See also notes 101-09 and accompanying text infra.
9. See Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America (pt. 1), 42
MICH. L. REv. 965 (1944); Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in
America (pt. 2), 43 MICH. L. REv. 113 (1944); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code:
Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453, 461-62 (1970).
10. L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE
(1946).
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manner and to deal effectively with these problems." Due to its
limited goals" and despite its influence on probate practices since
its publication, the Model Probate Code led to only fragmented
reform.' 3 Thus, the perception remained that the system was un-
responsive to the needs of contemporary society."
Subsequently, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law Section of the American Bar Association in the early 1960's
sponsored the development of a uniform probate law.'5 The result
was the Uniform Probate Code"8 [hereinafter referred to as the
UPC], which was approved by the American Bar Association in
1969.11 Since that time, the UPC has been enacted either in whole
or in part in eleven states.'8 At least two states have used prelimi-
11. Attempts to achieve uniformity among the states concerning particular aspects
of probate predate the MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946), see note 10 supra, by at least ten
years. Professor Atkinson stated that, in 1930, a committee appointed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to draft a UNIFORM ACT OF NOTICE
TO LEGATEES reported that the task of writing such an act, incorporating notice prior to
the admission of a will to probate, was impossible without abolishing probate in common
form. Atkinson, Wanted - A Model Probate Code, 23 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 183 (1940).
Professor Atkinson's article was the third of a series outlining the structure and functions
of probate courts. This series of articles represented the first call for general reform. See
also Atkinson, Old Principles and New Ideas Concerning Probate Court Procedure, 23 J.
Am. JuD. Soc'y 137 (1939); Atkinson, Organization of Probate Courts and the Qualifica-
tions of Probate Judges, 23 J. Am. Jun. So'Y 13 (1939). The MODEL PROBATE CODE (1946)
followed and was the result, at least in part, of Professor Atkinson's articles. See L. SIMES
& P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAw INCLUDING A MODEL PROBATE CODE 5-6 (1946).
12. "[The MODEL PROBATE CODE's (1946)] objective is not the attainment of uniform-
ity among the several states, but the improvement of probate procedure wherever revision
of probate legislation is sought. Primarily, it is intended as a reservoir of ideas, and of
acceptable legislative formulations of those ideas . . . ." L. SIMEs & P. BASYE, note 10
supra, at 10.
13. Committee of Administration and Distribution of Decedents' Estates,
Administrative Portions of the Draft Uniform Probate Code -An Appraisal, 2REALPROP.
PRoB. & TRUST J. 273 (1967) [hereinafter cited as the Committee Report].
14. N. DAcEY, note 3 supra; M. BLOoM, note 5 supra.
15. Committee Report, note 13 supra.
16. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975). There have been numerous commentaries on the
UPC or on its various and specific provisions. See, e.g., Wellman, Lawyers and the Uni-
form Probate Code, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 48 (1973); Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code:
A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191 (1969). Not all commentaries
have been favorable. See, e.g., Zartman, An Illinois Critique of the Uniform Probate Code,
1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413.
17. Association's House of Delegates Meets in Dallas, August 11-13, 55 A.B.A.J. 970,
976 (1969).
18. The states which have enacted the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE in either the 1969 or
1975 version include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005-.100 (1972); Arizona, ARIZ. REy.
STAT. §§ 14-1101 to -7307 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-10-101 to
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nary drafts as models for their reformed state codes.'9 Other states
currently have the UPC under study or consideration."0 South
Carolina has joined this latter group.2'
The UPC is designed, among other things, to simplify and
clarify the law regarding the settlement of decedents' and pro-
tected persons' estates and to promote a quick and efficient sys-
tem for the distribution of decedents' property to those who are
-17-401 (1973); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 15-1-101 to -7-401 (Cum. Supp. 1977); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 (West 1975); Montana, MONT. Ray. CODE ANN.
§ 71A-1-101 to 91A-6-104 (Supp. 1977); Nebraska, NEB. RaV. STAT. §§ 30-2201 to -2902
(1976); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-1-101 to -7-401 (Supp. 1976); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to -35-01 (1976); and Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101
to -8-101 (Supp. 1977).
South Dakota also adopted the UPC, effective January 1, 1976. Uniform Probate
Code, ch. 196, 1974 S.D. Sess. Laws 332. Subsequently, the South Dakota Legislature,
reacting to the determined resistance of one powerful lawyer member, repealed the UPC
effective July 1, 1976. Repealing Uniform Probate Code, ch. 175, 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 312;
Raising Coverage of Summary Probate Law, ch. 177, 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 317. Among
the reasons given for this repeal were claims that the UPC would "garble land titles"
and that the independent administration of the estate by the executor would result in
more probate defalcations than if the state employed some degree of supervised estate
administration. Wellman, The UPC Defeat in South Dakota, UPC NOTEs, Oct. 1976, at
5.
Professor Wellman convincingly argues that the above reasons for repeal are miscon-
ceptions based on an essential lack of understanding of the UPC and, in the case of
defalcation, based on doubtful data. Id. One might wonder, as does Professor Wellman,
about the clarity of titles devolving from decedents who died during the six months the
UPC was in effect. Letter from L.A. Meeby to Joint Editorial Board for the UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE (May 17, 1976) and response thereto by Professor Wellman, reprinted in
UPC NoTEs, Oct. 1976, at 6. Curative legislation was adopted in 1977, but litigation
clearly is contemplated. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 29A-1-1 to -4 (Supp. 1977).
19. The two states which have used preliminary drafts of the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
(1975) are Maryland and Oregon. The third state which possibly used these preliminary
drafts is Wisconsin. UPC NoTEs, July 1974, at 1.
20. Professor Wellman, Reporter for the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975), lists Hawaii,
New Jersey, Michigan, Maine, Tennessee, Alabama, Kentucky, Illinois, Ohio, Texas,
Georgia, and Mississippi as the states which are either considering UPC legislation or
studying the UPC. Wellman & Gordon, The Uniform Probate Code: Article IX Analyzed
in Relation to Changes in the First Nine Enactments, 1975 ARIz. ST. L.J. 477, 478 n.2.
21. In 1965, former Associate Justice Legg prepared a proposed South Carolina Pro-
bate Code for the Judicial Council. Though these proposals were never formally enacted,
the theories underlying Associate Justice Legg's suggestions were followed in subsequent
legislation. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-23-580 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
Sometime later, the South Carolina State Bar Association commissioned a study of
the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) in relation to existing law by professors at the Univer-
sity of South Carolina School of Law. With this study now complete, the Estate Practices
Committee is establishing subcommittees to develop policies and recommendations in
such broad areas as intestate succession, probate administration, court structure, and
jurisdiction. It is expected that specific proposals for revision will be made.
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entitled to such property.22 The UPC extends over three hundred
pages in its official draft form and addresses all aspects of testa-
mentary and testamentary-like practices. For example, it extends
the jurisdiction of the probate court to include both inter vivos
and testamentary trusts.2 The UPC thereby establishes a single
court with trial level jurisdiction over matters relating to the
transmission of wealth from one person to another and from one
generation to another. The UPC also authorizes powers of attor-
ney that survive the subsequent incompetency of the donor so
that unnecessary guardianships may be avoided. 24 It provides a
simplified procedure for the execution and proof of Wills 25 and
establishes a pattern of intestate succession 21 that is consistent
with that which most people would choose .2 Further, the UPC
significantly expands family protection. 28 As it is not feasible to
discuss the UPC in its entirety, this article will focus upon and
briefly discuss three areas of particular importance to the bench
22. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-102 (1975).
23. Id. § 7-201. Trusts are defined as including both inter vivos and testamentary
transactions. See id. § 1-201(45).
24. Id. § 5-501.
25. Id. § 2-502 requires two witnesses as compared with the three presently required
in South Carolina. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-50 (1976). The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975)
authorizes the use of self-proved wills. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-504 (1975). A self-
proved will is a will in which the testator and the witnesses attest, in writing, to the
regularity of the will's execution. Id. The use of self-proved wills does not preclude a
contest of the validity of the purported will, except as to signature. Id. § 2-504, Comment.
With informal probate, which is similar to South Carolina's probate in common form,
self.proof has little significance since the necessity of the witness's testimony is dispensed
with by the UPC. Id. § 3-303. However, under present South Carolina law, the testimony
of one witness is required. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976). The real value of self-proof
lies with formal probate, which is much like present probate in solemn or due form, where
the testimony of one witness is required by the UPC. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-406
(1975). Under existing South Carolina law, all witnesses must testify. S.C. CODE ANN. §
21-7-640 (1976).
Self-proof conclusively presumes compliance with the signature requirements of the
execution of a will. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-406 (1975). There is no counterpart of a
self-proved will in South Carolina. For a discussion of formal and informal probate, see
notes 96-145 and accompanying text infra.
26. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, -103 (1975). Generally, the UPC prefers the
surviving spouse over the collateral kin of the decedent. This differs from the present
practice in South Carolina, which admits collaterals into the distribution of the estate in
addition to the surviving spouse. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976). For a more complete
discussion of the rationale on which the UPC's intestate provisions are based, see notes
32-46 and accompanying text infra.
27. See note 37 infra.
28. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401, -403 (1975). See notes 70-90 and accompanying
text infra.
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and bar of South Carolina. These three areas are: 1) the UPC's
pattern for spousal and family protection;29 2) the procedures for
opening, administering and closing estates;" and 3) the structure
and function of the court of probate.3
1
II. FAMILY PROTECTION
A. Protection of the Surviving Spouse
Statutes of descent and distribution have long been recog-
nized as being surrogate wills, providing schemes for the disposi-
tion of property that an intestate most likely would have made
for himself.2 Indeed, the original English statutes was described
by Lord Chief Justice Raymond as a parliamentary will. 4 If the
parliamentary wills are intended to reflect that which the intes-
tate would have done for himself, recent studies show that most
of these wills, as established by various states' statutes of distri-
bution, including South Carolina's,35 fail in effectuating this in-
tent .3  Actual wills differ substantially from statutory wills, at
least in regard to the surviving spouse.17
29. See notes 32-90 and accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 91-246 and accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 247-68 and accompanying text infra.
32. E.g., Barron v. Janney, 225 Md. 228, 170 A.2d 176 (1961); In re Williams Estate,
162 Misc. 507, 295 N.Y.S. 56 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 254 App. Div. 741, 4 N.Y.S.2d 467
(1938); Magee v. Chambers, 17 Del. Ch. 45, 147 A. 306 (1929); Sorrels v. McNally, 89 Fla.
457, 105 So. 106 (1925).
33. 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 10 (1670).
34. Edwards v. Freeman, 24 Eng. Rep. 803, 806 (1727).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976). Basically, the South Carolina intestate statute
treats the widow as a child for purposes of distribution. Thus, if the decedent leaves a
widow and a child, each shares equally in the estate. Id. § 21-3-20(1). If a decedent leaves
a widow and more than one child, the widow takes one-third of her spouse's estate, and
the children share the remaining two-thirds of the estate. Id. The widow never takes less
than a third of the estate, regardless of the number of children.
If the decedent is survived by a widow but not by children, the widow takes one-half
of the estate, and the blood relatives of the decedent share the remaining half. Id. § 21-3-
20(2)-(5). Only where the decedent is not survived by a child or lineal descendant, a father,
mother, brother or sister of the whole-blood, a child of such a brother or sister, a brother
or sister of the half-blood, or by a lineal ancestor will the widow take the entire estate
under current law. Id. § 21-3-20(6).
36. See note 37 infra.
37. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES, & D. SMiTH, THE Flmmy AND INHERITANCE (1970)
[hereinafter cited as SUSSMAN]. The authors report that, based on a 1965 study of probate
estates closed in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (Cleveland), 85.8% of the testators who were
survived by a spouse and lineal descendants or ancestors did not follow the Ohio statute
of distribution, OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN. § 2105.06 (Page 1976), but rather bequeathed their
entire estate to the surviving spouse. SUSSMAN at 89.
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It appears unlikely that any statutory pattern of distribution
can be developed that would be appropriate for universal applica-
tion as there are simply too many people with too many differing
problems and estate objectives. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
expect the various statutes of descent and distribution to reflect
the common desires of a decedent, that is, to be truly a surrogate
will in fact as well as in theory. To accomplish this, most existing
statutes governing succession to intestate property need to be
amended to include one feature found in actual wills that is gen-
erally absent from parliamentary wills, i.e., a recognition that
normally the surviving spouse is the principal concern of the de-
cedent."
The UPC represents a compromise between prevalent testa-
mentary patterns and traditional distribution statutes. 9 As com-
pared to the latter, the UPC provides for the surviving spouse
generally to be given an increased share of the estate, never to be
less than one-half." The surviving spouse will receive the first
$50,000 of the estate in addition to one-half the remaining estate,
An earlier study in Cook County, Illinois (Chicago), with a much smaller sample,
revealed that 100% of the testators who were survived by a spouse and children chose a
scheme of distribution different from that of the intestate statute, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3,
§ 2-1 (Smith-Hurd 1977), and left their entire estate to the spouse and excluded the
children completely. Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmis-
sion at Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1962).
A more recent study, taken of living persons without examining their wills, demon-
strates that more than one-half of the respondents would exclude children from participa-
tion in their estate in favor of a surviving spouse and that, if there were no surviving
children, they would exclude parents in favor of the surviving spouse. Fellows, Sinion,
Snapp & Snapp, An Empirical Study of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U. ILL.
L.F. 717. The authors offer three possible bases on which to reconcile the discrepancy in
the percentage of disinheritances of children demonstrated in their study with that in
SUSSMAN'S study: (1) lawyer advice at the time of actually drafting the will; (2) relatively
more participants without children existed in this study than existed in SUSSMAN's; and
(3) a higher percentage of females was present in this sample group than were in
SUSSMAN'S. The authors found that women were far less likely to disinherit their children
in favor of their spouses than were males. Id. at 729-30. However, the authors would
discount the female response and weigh more heavily the male response as men are likely
to die sooner than women. Id. at 731. Despite their findings, the authors suggest that a
total disinheritance of children in favor of a surviving spouse is desirable as a matter of
social policy because of the need of the spouse for continued support and because, if
minors were allowed to participate in the estate, of the necessity for guardianships.
There are no similar studies in existence concerning South Carolina, either of the wills
actually admitted to probate or of the intention of living persons.
38. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102, Comment (1975); note 37 supra; SussMAN,
note 37 supra, at 86-103.
39. See note 37 supra.
40. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (1975). See note 35 supra.
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unless the decedent is also survived by issue who are not also issue
of the spouse. 4' In the latter instance, she receives only one-half
of the estate." The same pattern, $50,000 plus one-half of the
remaining estate to the spouse, is employed if the decedent is
survived by his spouse and parents, but not by issue.43 If the
decedent is not survived by issue or parents, his surviving spouse
takes the entire estate to the exclusion of all collaterals.
44
The practical effect of these provisions, at least in modest
estates, is to allow the surviving spouse to take the entire estate
to the exclusion of all other claimants. This is an intended result
of the UPC 5 and is consistent with actual patterns of testate
distribution. Such a result is impermissible, however, under ex-
isting South Carolina law.46
Clearly, there are instances where the UPC's provisions for
the spouse or, for that matter, any intestate distribution to the
spouse would be inappropriate. For example, if the surviving
spouse was unfit or unable to handle property, or unwilling to
care for minor children, or if the decedent and the spouse had
marital difficulties, outright gifts to her might be unwarranted.
41. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(3) (1975).
42. Id. § 2-102(4).
43. Id. § 2-102(2).
44. Id. § 2-102, Comment. SUSSMAN, note 37 supra, reveals that the average gross
value of all estates in the study was $31,097, the value of intestate estates was $8,599, and
that the median of intestate estates was $6,000. Id. at 73. Of this study, only two estates
which had a gross value of $60,000 or more were intestate. Id. at 292.
Allowing for inflationary pressures since 1965, under the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
(1975) a surviving spouse will probably take the entire intestate estate, even where the
estate may exceed $50,000 in value. The spouse may be paid an allowance for the family,
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (1975), for homestead, id. § 2-401, and personal property,
id. § 2-402. Together, these may total as much as $14,500 and may be delivered to the
surviving spouse without specific authorization by the court. Thus, she will receive the
entire estate if it totals less than $64,500. This is clearly a desirable result as it prevents
the fragmentation of small estates and, where there are minor children, eliminates the
need of protective proceedings in order for property to pass to minor children. Id. § 2-102,
Comment.
45. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) § 2-102(1), Comment.
46. Either applicable law or the provisions of a will may limit the surviving spouse
as to what she receives from the estate. In the case of intestacy, she can never take the
entire intestate estate in South Carolina unless the stringent conditions of S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-3-20(6) (1976) are met. For a discussion of the precarious position of the surviving
spouse in South Carolina, see note 35 supra.
There is presently no provision of an allowance for the widow or family in any form.
Homestead and personal property exemptions are limited to the property which the sur-
viving spouse receives by intestacy or will. Dorn v. Stidham, 139 S.C. 66, 137 S.E. 331
(1926).
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However, these are precisely the situations in which society and
the UPC reasonably expect the decedent to have made a will. The
UPC's pattern of distribution, because it must serve as every-
man's will, is drafted for the norm, i.e., towards that which will
serve the greatest need. Special situations regularly fall beyond
the scope of the parliamentary will.
Beyond intestacy, there are other situations under existing
South Carolina law where provisions for a surviving spouse may
be inadequate. For example, at present a husband may totally
exclude his spouse from his will, although in doing so he may not
deny her dower.4" A wife may completely disinherit her husband
since he has no dower equivalent. 8 In either case, whether made
deliberately or as a result of neglect or oversight, an unfair or
inadequate testamentary provision is binding on the survivor
since present law provides no way of avoiding the will, save by
contest of its validity." Even when dower is available for a widow,
47. Dower is the common law right of a widow to maintenance from her deceased
husband's real property. See Elder v. McIntosh, 88 S.C. 286, 70 S.E. 807 (1911). In
Jefferies v. Allen, 33 S.C. 268, 11 S.E. 764 (1890), common law dower was defined by
Justice McGowan as "that portion of lands which a wife hath for the term of her life in
the lands of her husband after his decease." Id. at 270-71, 11 S.E. at 765. By statute, dower
is admeasured against one-third of the husband's lands. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-910
(1976). If the property subject to dower cannot be equally and fairly separated from the
remainder of the husband's lands, then the heir at law or the person in possession of the
land shall pay the widow a sum in lieu of dower. Id. § 21-5-930. The proper assessment
in this situation is one-sixth of the appraised value of all the husband's lands. Jefferies v.
Allen, 33 S.C. 268, 11 S.E. 764 (1890); Stewart v. Blease, 4 S.C. 37 (1872).
The widow may be required, either by express direction or by implication, to choose
between her dower rights and the testamentary provisions made in her favor. Bomar v.
Wilkens, 154 S.C. 64, 151 S.E. 110 (1929). If the husband does not put her to an election,
she may have both. Id. A wife may not, however, have both her dower rights and her
distributive share of the husband's intestate estate. She must choose one or the other. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-5-710 (1976). See generally Note, Widow's Election Between Dower and
Other Benefits, 9 S.C.L.Q. 277 (1957). For a form of bequest requiring election, see
WILKINS, DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUST AGREEMENTS IN SOUTH CAROLINA 544 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as WILKINS].
48. Tenancy by curtesy was abolished in 1883. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-10 (1976).
Dower by its terms is applicable only to women. Id. §§ 21-5-110 to -990. See Elder v.
McIntosh, 88 S.C. 286, 70 S.E. 807 (1911).
49. This assumes, of course, that the will is actually presented and admitted to
probate. If the custodian of the will refuses to present the will, it obviously has no effect
on the distribution of the estate because proof of the will, admission to probate, and the
issuance of letters testamentary are essential to effectuate probate. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-
15-50 (1976). See Counts v. Wilson, 45 S.C. 571, 23 S.E. 942 (1896). Thus, it is clear that
an aggrieved spouse who has possession of the decedent's will or, for that matter, anyone
having possession of the will who sympathizes with the spouse, can prevent the will from
becoming effective.
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it is likely to be of limited protection since it exists only in realty.
Personalty, the major factor in family wealth today, is free from
dower or any equivalent interest."
The UPC would afford the spouse a much greater degree of
protection. Under the UPC, a surviving spouse may elect against
the decedent's will and take one third of his augmented 5' estate. 2
Though the concept of an elective share is novel for South Caro-
lina, the concept that a will need not be conclusive of the rights
of a widow is not.
3
Generally, in other jurisdictions, when a spouse is dissatis-
fied with the testamentary gifts made to him or her, and an
election against the will is permitted, the electing spouse is enti-
tled to take a share of the probate estate, 4 the size of the share
Refusal to present the will entails criminal liability, however. Anyone having posses-
sion of a will must present it to the judge of probate within 30 days of the decedent's death.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-730 (1976). Failure to do so may result in a misdemeanor violation.
Id. § 21-7-780. Intentional or fraudulent destruction or suppression of a will may be
punished by a fine up to $500, imprisonment, or both. Id. § 21-7-790. However, the
command of these statutes and the imposable sanctions do not appear to be of sufficient
weight so as to deter the failure to produce a nonbeneficial will. Presumably, if no will
was presented, it would be difficult to establish that a will was being suppressed. Even if
such suppression were established, the penalties are not severe. This may explain the
paucity of prosecution in this area. There has been but one case involving the suppression
of a will, and that was based on an allegation of common law conspiracy. State v. DeWitt,
20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 282 (1834).
Once the will is admitted and becomes final, either by the passage of time from the
initiation of probate in common form or by virtue of probate in due form, it is not subject
to either direct or collateral attack. Jackson v. Cannon, 266 S.C. 198, 222 S.E.2d 494
(1976); Wooten v. Wooten, 235 S.C. 228, 110 S.E.2d 922 (1959); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson,
178 S.C. 194, 182 S.E. 640 (1935).
50. By definition, dower is limited to real estate. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-5-910 (1976).
See Lamar v. Scott, 34 S.C.L. (3 Strob.) 562 (1849).
51. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201(a),-202 (1975). For a discussion of the composi-
tion of the augmented estate, see notes 56-64 and accompanying text supra.
52. In order to make the election, the surviving spouse must file with the court or
deliver to the personal representative her petition of election within nine months of the
decedent's death or within six months of the probate of the decedent's will, whichever is
later. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-205(a) (1975). This petition institutes a judicial
proceeding to determine the composition and value of the augmented estate. See id. § 2-
205(b).
While the surviving spouse may elect in her discretion, there is no need for her to do
so if the decedent has adequately provided for her through testamentary or inter vivos gifts
that exceed her elective share of one-third of the augmented estate. If the surviving spouse
has been fairly treated, an election under the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975), as described
above, would gain her nothing and only would delay her distributive share. See notes 56-
68 and accompanying text infra.
53. See WILKINS, note 47 supra.
54. The term "probate estate" encompasses only those assets subject to administra-
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being dependent upon the number and character of other surviv-
ing heirs. 5 Under the UPC, the electing spouse always takes a
third of the augmented estate, rather than a varying share of the
probate estate. The augmented estate is the total of the probate
estate, less funeral and administration expenses, plus gratuitous
testamentary-like transfers made by the decedent during the
marriage to persons other than the spouse and all gifts made
within two years of death, except for gifts of $3,000 to any one
person in each of those years." In addition, it includes all prop-
erty owned by the spouse at the decedent's death, which the
spouse received from or through the decedent during his life-
time ."
In many respects, the augmented estate is similar to the
gross estate under federal and South Carolina estate tax law." For
example, just as the gross estate includes transfers of wealth
made prior to death that are incomplete because the transferor
retained some dominion over the subject matter of the transfer, 9
the augmented estate also includes property formally transferred
in which the transferor retained some beneficial interest."0 How-
tion, including real property. It excludes, for example, property which the decedent pos-
sessed in joint and survivor tenancy with another, life insurance proceeds, and property
in an inter vivos trust established by the decedent. See N. DACEY, note 3 supra; R. LYNN,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE PLANNING (1975). Though such property is not subject to
administration and is excluded from the probate estate, it is subject to federal estate
taxation. I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2036, 2038, 2042.
55. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page 1976); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2508(b) (Purdon 1975). The Ohio statute provides that the surviving spouse's share shall
be one-half of the decedent's gross estate. The Pennsylvania statute provides that the
spouse's share shall be one-third or one-half of the gross estate, depending upon the
existence of surviving children or surviving issue of children.
56. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1)(iv) (1975).
57. Id. § 2-202(2).
58. I.R.C. § 2031-2044; S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-40 (1976). South Carolina's estate
tax law parallels the federal estate tax law. Thus, while there is no express state marital
deduction, that provision is incorporated into the state tax law by reference. Clark v.
South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 259 S.C. 161, 191 S.E.2d 23 (1972). However, the recently
enacted Federal Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 43 STAND. FED. TAX REp.
(CCH) 1001 (Sept. 25, 1976), has not yet been incorporated into the state estate tax law.
Though it probably will be incorporated, the impact it will have on state revenue cannot
be ascertained as it both increases the marital deduction, I.R.C. § 2056(c), and replaces
the previous specific exemption of $60,000 with a credit applicable to both testamentary
and nontestamentary transfers, id. § 2010.
59. I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2036, 2038.
60. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(1) (1975). If the right of election were limited to
the probate estate, see note 54 supra, it would be fairly simple for the decedent to emascu-
late this right by using nontestamentary methods to pass his property, e.g., joint accounts
12
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ever, this analogy is not a perfect one. Under the federal estate
tax law, insurance on the decedent's life is included in his gross
estate if he retained any incident of ownership." The augmented
estate, in contrast, includes only life insurance payable to the
surviving spouse, and only then if the decedent paid the prem-
iums." Similarly, while all gifts made to the surviving spouse,
regardless of when made, are included in the augmented estate,6"
gifts to a spouse of one-half the adjusted gross estate or $250,000,
whichever is the larger, may be deducted in computing the taxa-
ble estate. 4 These latter examples illustrate the difference in the
purposes of the tax law and the augmented estate. The former is
designed to subject all testamentary and testamentary-like trans-
actions to taxation in order to generate income for public pur-
poses and, at the same time, to accomplish the distribution of
wealth in our society. 5 The augmented estate, on the other hand,
is designed to insure that a spouse receives only a fair share of the
total family wealth, whether by lifetime gift, by testamentary
provision, or by election.6
Obviously, a determination of the composition and value" of
the augmented estate may not be simple in any given case. As
discussed above, the purpose of the augmented estate is the pro-
tection of the spouse and not the simplicity of use. The potential
complexity of this determination and the litigation that may rea-
with the right to survivorship and revocable trusts as to which he retains the power of
control and disposition. See I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTIcE MANUAL 99 (2d ed. 1977).
Thus, under existing law there is little a South Carolina widow may do to avoid such
transfers other than assert her dower interest. There is nothing a widower may do as he
has neither curtesy nor dower rights. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5-10, -910 (1976).
61. I.R.C. § 2042.
62. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (1975). Life insurance payable to someone other
than the surviving spouse is not included in the augmented estate, even though the
decedent had retained incidents of ownership. I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL
100 (2d ed. 1977).
63. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 202(2) (1975); I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE
MANUAL 99 (2d ed. 1977).
64. I.R.C. § 2056(c). See note 58 supra.
65. See House Comm. on Ways and Means, Estate and Gift Tax Reform Act of 1976,
H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976).
66. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202, Comment (1975). See also note 60 supra.
67. Normally, the components of the augmented estate are valued as of the dece-
dent's death. However, property that was irrevocably transferred during the decedent's
lifetime is valued as of the time the donee first came into possession or enjoyment of the
property. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-202(2) (1975). Similarly, valuation of the spouse's
property that is derived from the decedent is determined at the time the gift became
irrevocable or the decedent died, whichever came first. Id. § 2-202(3)(ii).
1978]
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sonably be expected to follow is designed to caution potential
claimants as to the seriousness of the endeavor and to discourage
elections." Practitioners may expect to see few such elections
since they would be of doubtful utility in most cases. Neverthe-
less, there is much to be said for making a process available by
which a spouse who has been omitted from a will or who has been
given a minimal devise may obtain a fair share of the family
wealth to which she has contributed both services and, in all
probability, capital. Thus, the societal limitation on the disinher-
itance of immediate family found in the anti-lapse and pretermit-
ted heir statutes" are also found in the UPC's provisions protect-
ing the spouse as well as children.
B. Protection of the Family
Under present law, family members who are legatees, devi-
sees, distributees, or heirs participate in the estate only after
debts, expenses, and taxes have been determined and paid,7" and
the executor or administrator may not treat them with prefer-
ence.' Under the UPC this would change. The UPC recognizes
68. See id. § 2-202, Comment:
Depending on the circumstances it is obvious that this section will operate
in the long run to decrease substantially the number of elections. . . . [The
spouse can[not] [profitably] . . . elect in cases where substantial provision
[for her] is made by joint tenancy, life insurance, lifetime gifts, living trusts
set up by the decedent, and the other numerous nonprobate arrangements by
which wealth is today transferred ...
The augmented net estate approach embodied in this section is relatively
complex and assumes that litigation may be required in cases in which the right
to an elective share is asserted.
See generally Clark, The Recapture of Testamentary Substitutes to Preserve the Spouse's
Elective Share: An Appraisal of Recent Statutory Reforms, 2 CoN. L. Rv. 513, 537-43
(1970).
69. E.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-7-450, 460 (1976). Section 21-7-450 provides that
children born after the death of the testator shall participate equally with his other
children who were gifted. Section 21-7-460 extends this protection to children who were
born after the making of the will and who were unprovided for. As with posthumous
children, the child born after the will shares equally in the gifts made to the brothers and
sisters. The protection of these provisions is limited, however. With both these provisions,
protection is dependent upon gifts having been made to other children in which the
posthumous and afterborn children may share. In the absence of a gift, such children
receive nothing. Weinberg v. Weinberg, 208 S.C. 157, 167-68, 37 S.E.2d 507, 512 (1946).
70. The rights of a creditor are superior to the claims of estate beneficiaries. Graves
v. Spoon, 18 S.C. 386 (1883).
71. However, some courts have indicated that, where there is a good faith belief that
the estate is solvent, the administrator or executor may pay family members a portion of
their share of the estate ahead of creditors. E.g., Ex parte Boddie, 200 S.C. 379, 21 S.E.2d
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that the family, spouse, and dependent children all have legiti-
mate needs for subsistence to be satisfied from the property of the
decedent. Such needs do not cease to exist because of the dece-
dent's death. Therefore, the UPC adopts the concept of a family
allowance. This is a reasonable monetary payment out of the
assets of the estate, not necessarily to maintain the family's stan-
dard of living, but to assist the family unit during administra-
tion.72 The amount to be paid to the family, i.e., what is reasona-
ble, rests largely in the discretion of the personal representative.
He may pay up to $6,000 in a lump sum or make monthly pay-
ments of $500 without prior authorization of the court.73
In addition to the family allowance, the UPC provides for a
homestead allowance and personal property exemption - a max-
imum of $5,000 in the case of the former and $3,500 in the latter.74
In the case of homestead, the allowance is intended to secure for
the family unit some portion of the decedent's estate free from the
claims of creditors. 5 In other words, the intent is to give the
family a modest but hopefully adequate base with which to begin
anew. Thus, the allowance is not limited to the value in a home
or residence. Rather, recognizing that all families, including those
who live in rental housing - and perhaps these most of all -
require some sustenance to maintain the viability and functions
of the family unit, the UPC provides that the allowance be a
monetary payment out of the general estate." It is payable to the
surviving spouse or, if there is no surviving spouse, then equally
to the surviving minor and dependent children of the decedent.7
The exemption of personal property is similar. It, too, is
available to the family unit and is payable to the surviving spouse
or, if none, to the children of the decedent. Unlike the home-
4 (1942); Darby v. Darby, 7 S.C. Eq. (2 McCord Eq.) 451 (1827). At least one case has
spoken in terms that would require that the fiduciary care for the minor children. Lyles
v. McClure, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 7 (1828).
72. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (1975); id., Comment. As the allowance payable
to the wife, either in her own right or on behalf of the family as a unit, terminates on her
death, the payment would not qualify for the material deduction under I.R.C. § 2056 and
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-15-60 (1976). The portion of the allowance payable to the widow on
behalf of the remaining family would continue to be paid to its representative. UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § -2-403 (1975).
73. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (1975).
74. Id. §§ 2-401, -402.
75. See I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 111-12 (2d ed. 1977).
76. Id.; UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §'2-401 (1975).
77. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-401 (1975).
78. Id. §§ 2-401, -402.
1978]
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stead allowance, the personal property exemption is shared by all
children, whether dependent or not.
79
These allowances for the family, for homestead, and for per-
sonal property are not estates of inheritance. Rather, they are
familial claims on the estate of the deceased for maintenance and
are generally payable in addition to other benefits received by
will, by intestacy, or by way of the election of a share of the aug-
mented estate." However, a testator by express provision may
require a beneficiary to elect between his will and any one or more
of the allowances.81
These allowances may be thought of as similar to creditor
claims and, indeed, it may well be said that the family is in the
nature of a creditor, and a preferred one at that. Claims for the
homestead and family allowances and for the personal property
exemption have priority over other claims against the estate." As
to the priority among these allowances, the claim for homestead
is of first priority, followed, in order, by the family allowance and
the exempt personal property.83
The homestead allowance and personal property exemption
differ from the present South Carolina homestead allowance and
personal property exemption84 in two significant aspects. First,
the current allowance is constitutionally limited to $1,000 for
realty and $500 for personalty.5 The UPC cannot immediately
79. See id. § 2-402. Cf. id. § 2-401 (limiting homestead to minor and dependent
children).
80. Id. § 2-401 specifically provides that: "Homestead allowance is in addition to any
share passing to the surviving spouse or minor or dependent by the will of the decedent
, . . by intestate succession or by way of elective share." A similar statement is made
with respect to exempt property and the family allowance. Id. §§ 2-402, -403. See generally
I UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MANUAL 110-14 (2d ed. 1977).
81. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401 to -403 (1975). In this respect, the rights of the
testator are not unlike those of a husband under current practice in South Carolina. Under
existing law, the husband may force an election by his wife between his will and her dower
rights. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra. Thus, the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
(1975) allows a decedent to put a spouse to an election regarding the exemptions but
presumes that no such election would be automatically required. Id. § 2-402, Comment.
82. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 2-401 to -403 (1975). Property that is specifically
devised is not subject to the homestead allowance or the personal property exemption
unless the estate is otherwise inadequate. Id. § 2-404. The family allowance is a cash
payment, which is normally paid from the residue of the estate. See id.
83. Id. §§ 2-401 to -403.
84. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-41-10, -100 (1976) (homestead allowance); id. § 15-41-320
(personal property exemption).
85, S.C. CONST. art. III, § 28.
[Vol. 29
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change these figures. 6 Second, and of far greater importance, the
present allowances are available to the spouse and family only out
of qualifying87 property received by them from the decedent,
either through inheritance or testamentary gift. These current
allowances are never an additional entitlement, which they have
the potential of being under the UPC.s If nothing is received from
the testator, there is no homestead or personal property allowance
available to the family, as there are no assets to which it may
attach.89 However, in this situation, there is no justification for
not allowing the family to receive the allowances, for the estate
assets are benefiting relative strangers and not the decedent's
family. The UPC's provisions are consistent with the theory that
the benefit of the exemptions should be limited to the family. The
UPC's basic difference lies in the right of the family to the entitle-
ments. Under the UPC, these entitlements are generally avail-
able,9" regardless of the asset mix of the estate. This represents a
significant increase in protection for the family.
86. The South Carolina Supreme Court has so stated:
But when the people in their sovereign capacity. . . prescribed what should be
the nature and character of the homestead and personal property exempted,
describing what it should be, the particular kind of property, its amount and
value, and to whose benefit it should enure, all these matters were placed be-
yond the domain of legislative power and nothing was left for the general assem-
bly to do ....
Norton v. Bradham, 21 S.C. 375, 379-80 (1884).
87. Though the homestead exemption is limited to land, it encompasses estates in
land less than a fee. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-10 (1976). Thus, for example, leased lands
are a proper subject of homestead. Cf. Harrell v. Kea, 37 S.C. 369, 16 S.E. 42 (1892) (leased
land must be used as part of the homestead). It is not available in land owned by a tenant
in common as the debtor/decedent owned no particular land subject to being set-off under
a homestead claim. Eaddy v. Wall, 183 S.C. 229, 190 S.E. 497 (1937). However, once the
lands are partitioned and the debtor thus has an interest in specified land, the homestead
exemption may attach. Riley v. Gaines, 14 S.C. 454 (1881).
The personal property exemption is limited to that of the head of the family and to a
value of $500. If the debtor is not the head of the family, the exemption is limited to
necessary wearing apparel and to tools and implements of a trade, with a maximum total
value of $300. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-41-310 (1976).
88. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
89. Dorn v. Stidham, 139 S.C. 66, 137 S.E. 331 (1927); Ex parte Cothran, 128 S.C.
122, 121 S.E. 556 (1924); Ex parte Bullock, 58 S.C. 238, 36 S.E. 563 (1900).
90. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
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III. PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION
A. Probate of Estates
If the UPC's provisions regarding intestate distribution9' are
thought of as having the greatest divergence from present South
Carolina law,92 then its provisions for the opening of estates 3 and
their subsequent administration 4 and distribution 5 must be re-
garded as the closest to current South Carolina procedures and
practices.
The manner of admitting a will to probate provides a clear
illustration. Currently, the UPC offers two methods of initiating
probate. These two methods are informal" and formal 7 proceed-
ings, approximating probate in common form" and probate in
due form of law," provided for under existing statutes. 00
Probate in common form and the UPC's informal proceed-
ings both achieve a tentative probate, which is subject to confir-
mation or rejection if subsequent proceedings are timely filed."'
Prior notice to interested parties of an intent to seek probate in
common form is unnecessary, 102 and as a practical matter this is
also true of informal probate."03 However, in contrast to current
91. See notes 39-46 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
92. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976). See note 35 supra.
93. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-301 to -311, 3-401 to -414 (1975).
94. Id. §§ 3-701 to -721, 3-801 to -816.
95. Id. §§ 3-901 to -916, 3-1001 to -1008.
96. Id. § 3-301.
97. Id. § 3-401.
98. S.C. CODE ANN. 21-7-620 (1976).
99. Id. § 21-7-640.
100. Probate in common and due form refer only to testate proceedings. Letters of
administration of the intestate estate are issued pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-90
(1976). Both formal and informal proceedings under the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975)
are available whether the decedent died testate or intestate. Id. §§ 3-301, -401, -402.
101. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-440 (1976) (6 months); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-308
(1975) (the later of three years after the decedent's death or 12 months after the admitt-
ance of the will to informal probate).
102. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976) ("[w]ithout citing or calling before him such
as have interest the judge of probate may. . ."); Reed v. Lemacks, 204 S.C. 26, 28 S.E.2d
441 (1943) (probate of a will in common form is an ex parte proceeding).
103. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-302, -303, -306 (1975). There are two situations in
which the registrar may not act on an ex parte application. Any person desiring notice of
orders or filings may file a demand with the court, even before the appointment of a
representative. Id. § 3-204. In the unlikely event this is done, no order or filing to which
the demand relates may be made or accepted. Id. Further, if a personal representative of
the decedent had been previously appointed, he is required to be given notice by the
moving party unless his appointment has been terminated. Id. § 3-306. Additionally, if
18
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South Carolina practice, the UPC requires that post-probate no-
tice be given to interested persons' 4 by the personal representa-
tive, 05 where letters testamentary are issued'8 or by the applicant
for probate, where letters testamentary are not sought.0 7
The absence of a similar notice requirement in cases of pro-
bate in common form is a serious failure of the South Carolina
Code.'0 8 In effect, the heirs bear the responsibility for learning of
both the decedent's death and the probate of his will. Ordinarily,
this burden presents no serious problems as the death of the
decedent likely will be known to his family. However, if the heirs
are not close family or their relationship with the decedent was
such that they would not learn of his death or of the probate of
the will in the ordinary course of events, they have no way of
knowing that they must act promptly to protect their interests.
Unless the executor or someone looking out for their interests tells
them of the probate, the time for contesting the will may pass
before the heirs learn of their right to contest. Rather than placing
the burden of gaining such knowledge on the heirs, it would be
better to require, as does the UPC,'0 ' that the executor notify
the application is for the appointment of a respresentative, the applicant must give notice
of his intention to seek informal appointment to any person having a prior or equal right
to appointment. He must also provide notice to those who request it. Id. § 3-310. The
latter requirement appears the most likely to cause the proceeding not to be ex parte.
However, even this ordinarily will not be the case since those entitled to notice may waive
this right. Id. With the bulk of applications, i.e., those where there are no family disputes,
this waiver of the right to notice should be the norm.
104. Interested persons are defined by the UNIFORM PROBATE COnE § 1-201(20) (1975)
as including "heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries and any others
having a property right in or claim against. . . the estate of a decedent . . . which may
be affected by the proceeding." It also includes those who have priority for appointment.
Id.
105. Essentially, the term "personal representative" encompasses all estate fiduciar-
ies, such as executors and administrators. Id. § 1-201(30).
106. Id. § 3-705. The notice must be given to heirs and devisees within 30 days of his
appointment. Id.
107. Id. § 3-306. The applicant must provide the notice to heirs and devisees within
30 days of the grant of informal probate. Id.
108. Cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-90 (1976) (notice is given to next of kin and creditors
of an intestate before letters of administration are granted). This provision allows inter-
ested persons to be heard as to the qualifications of the petitioner for letters. Ex parte
Small, 69 S.C. 43, 48 S.E. 40 (1904). There is no indication that the hearing is intended
to establish intestacy, except incidently insofar as necessary to issue letters. Indeed, it is
clear that the grant of letters does not prevent the subsequent probate of a valid will. See
Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3 (1898). Clearly this hearing cannot be likened to
a formal testacy determination under UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-401 (1975).
109. See notes 104-07 and accompanying text supra.
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interested persons of his appointment. While the giving of notice
may result in a greater number of will contests, the benefit of
insuring that all concerned persons be aware of their rights and
be given a fair chance to protect them, if they determine that to
be necessary, outweighs any inconvenience which may result due
to a greater frequency of will contests.
Probate is now initiated in common form by a petition ad-
dressed to the probate judge."' An application for informal pro-
bate under the UPC would be addressed to an administrative
official identified by the UPC as the registrar."' The duties of the
registrar and the present probate judge are nearly identical."2
Each must satisfy himself that the will is complete and that the
application has been properly completed."' However, the duties
of the two differ in this regard. The probate judge must take the
testimony of at least one of the witnesses and satisfy himself that
the offered document is indeed the decedent's last will and testa-
ment."4 The registrar, on the other hand, does not have any simi-
lar adjudicative power. He does not take the testimony of the
subscribing witnesses."' In any event, the inability to examine
witnesses is immaterial as their testimony is unnecessary for in-
formal probate."' If the registrar finds the will to be regular and
the application in order, he will admit the will to probate."'
Ordinarily, an application for probate will be accompanied
by an application for appointment of a personal representative. 8
Certainly this is true today. While the two applications are tech-
110. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-420 (1976).
111. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-301(a) (1975).
112. Compare Davis v. Davis, 214 S.C. 247, 52 S.E.2d 192 (1949) (probate in common
form settles all questions concerning formalities of creation) with UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 3-303, Comment (1975) ("The purpose of this section is to permit informal probate of a
will which . . . appears to have been executed properly.").
113. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-303 (1975).
114. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976).
115. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-303(c) (1975).
116. Id.
117. Id. § 3-302. The registrar may, however, decline to admit the will because of the
failure to meet the requirements specified in §§ 3-303, -304. However, he may also de-
cline to admit the will for any reason. Id. § 3-305. This decision by the registrar, unlike
the result of the refusal of the South Carolina probate judge to admit the will, is not an
adjudication. Id. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976); Davis v. Davis, 214 S.C. 247,
52 S.E.2d 192 (1949). The registrar must refuse to admit a will to probate if the will
appears to be one of a series of wills, the latest of which does not expressly revoke earlier
wills. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-304 (1975).
118. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-301 (1975).
[Vol. 29
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nically separate,"' they are in fact dependent on each other. The
present South Carolina statute specifically provides that a will
may not be probated unless an application for either letters testa-
mentary or letters of administration has been filed.120 However,
under the UPC, this dependence is dispensed with as the probate
of the will and the appointment of a representative are distinct
and independent acts. Occasionally an application for probate
also may be filed simply to confirm title."'
As an alternative to the informal proceedings outlined above,
the UPC permits the applicant to undertake formal proceedings
in order to determine the validity of a will122 or to confirm intes-
tacy.' 23 These proceedings may be initiated either before an infor-
mal determination is requested or subsequent thereto.
2 4
Just as current probate in common form and the UPC's infor-
mal proceedings are similar, the adoption of the UPC's formal
proceedings would be very similar to probate in solemn or due
form.' 25 These latter proceedings differ, however, in at least two
respects. Presently, solemn form probate may be initiated only
after the will has been admitted to probate in common form.'
26
Under the UPC, formal proceedings may be used without first
instituting the informal proceeding, since the two proceedings are
independent of each other. 27 Further, under current practice,
there is no way of finally determining intestacy because a will
may be admitted whenever it is discovered, even though many
years may have passed since the death of the decedent and even
though an intestate proceeding may have been completed.' 2 The
formal proceedings of the UPC, in contrast, may be utilized to
establish intestacy conclusively.'2 Even in the absence of a deter-
119. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-620 (1976) makes reference to proof of a will, while S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-15-50 (1976) refers to an apparently separate application for letters testa-
mentary. In practice, however, one application serves both purposes. A. MosEs, SOUTH
CAROLINA PROBATE PRACTICE MANUAL PPM Form 3 (1974). The form is available from the
probate court. Id.
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-50 (1976).
121. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-101, -102 (1975).
122. Id. § 3-401. See id., Comment.
123. Id. § 3-401.
124. Id.
125. Compare id. §§ 3-401, -406, with S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-640 (1976).
126. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-640 (1976).
127. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-401 (1975).
128. See Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3 (1898) (will admitted to probate 54
years after testator's death).
129. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-108, -412 (1975).
1978]
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mination by a formal proceeding, once three years have passed
from the death of the decedent, intestacy is conclusively estab-
lished, and a will may no longer be proved.' 3
As with probate in solemn form, 13' formal testacy proceedings
are full notice hearings,'32 to which all interested persons have
been made a party.'33 Formal proceedings are not simply an ad-
ministrative determination of the validity of a will, as is the case
with informal probate. Rather, formal proceedings are heard by
the judge of probate3' in a regular civil trial, which includes the
right to a jury. ' As a consequence, the decision of the court is
conclusive as to all parties,' 36 subject to the normal appellate
process.' 7
If, as may be expected, informal probate is followed by for-
mal proceedings in the nature of a will contest, the UPC would
extend, by at least six months, the present period of limitation
for bringing a will contest.'38 Formal proceedings must be filed
within twelve months of informal probate or within three years
of the decedent's death, whichever is later.1'3 This limitation also
has the effect of imposing a needed absolute maximum time for
130. Id. § 3-108.
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-640 (1976).
132. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-401, -403 (1975).
133. Notice is required to be given to the surviving spouse, children, and other heirs
of the decedent. Additionally, all devisees and executors named in a related will must be
notified. Publication notice also must be given to all unknown persons and known persons
whose addresses are unknown and who have an interest in the litigation. Of course, notice
must be given to those who have filed a demand for notice. Id. § 3-403(a). Further, if the
death of the purported decedent is in doubt, notice must be given to him at his last known
address. Id. 3-403(b).
134. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) speaks of the court rather than of the judge,
but it is clear that the reference only refers to, in this context, the judicial officer because
no functions are assigned to the registrar in formal proceedings, in contrast to the practice
in informal proceedings. Compare, e.g., UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-401 and § 3-409 with
§ 3-301 and § 3-302 (1975).
135. Id. § 1-306. A jury must be demanded. Id. The parties are entitled to a jury for
questions of fact in an action for probate in solemn form, unless waived. Meier v. Kornah-
rens, 113 S.C. 270, 102 S.E. 285 (1920).
136. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-412 (1975).
137. Id. §§ 1-308, 3-412. Appeals would be permitted on questions of law only since
the court has complete and exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters. Id. § § 1-302, -308,
3-412. See generally notes 256-57 and accompanying text infra.
138. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-640 (1976) provides that probate in due form must be
initiated within six months of probate in common form. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
(1975) provides that an application for a formal determination of testacy must be brought
within three years after the decedent's death or 12 months after informal probate, which-
ever is later. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-108 (1975).
139. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-108 (1975).
[Vol. 29
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initiating probate of a will. Such a limitation, which does not
presently exist,'40 would serve to stabilize titles to real property. 4,
For example, assume that a devisee"' enters real property under
a will admitted to probate according to existing practice and that
the will is subsequently set aside because of the discovery and
probate of a later, valid will. His only title protection against the
claimants under the later will would be through application of the
doctrine of adverse possession.4 3 For at least ten years from the
date of his entry, despite the fact that a court had confirmed the
authorizing document as the will of the decedent, he is in jeop-
ardy.'44 This is too long a period for titles to remain unsettled
when the entry appears rightful. The UPC's limitation would
serve the salutary purpose of requiring claimants under an unpro-
bated will to assert that will promptly, i.e., within three years.'4 '
B. Administration of Estates
Just as the UPC in many respects parallels existing practice
as to the probate of estates,' so too does it parallel existing
practice with respect to the administration of estates. Though the
UPC uses somewhat different terminology regarding the individ-
uals who administer estates-what are presently identified as
executors'47 and administrators'48 are referred to by the UPC as
140. See Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3 (1898).
141. See notes 143-44 and accompanying text infra.
142. "Devisee" as used in this context refers to the testate successor to real property.
See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-7-420 (1976).
143. Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3 (1898). See Taylor v. Jennings, 233 S.C.
600, 106 S.E.2d 391 (1953); Crossland's Ex'rs v. Murdock, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 217
(1827).
144. An action for the recovery of real property may be brought at any time within
ten years of the deseizen of the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-3-340 (1976). In some instances the party ejected may be able to recover
at least some of his costs. Section 27-27-10 allows a defendant who purchased the property
expecting the title to be good to recover from the successful plaintiff, in an action for
ejectment, the full value of all improvements made by him or by those under whom he
claims. The protection offered is not extended to devisees since the statute speaks of
purchasers. At any rate, this protection may be dubious at best. Recovery is limited to
the increase in value of the land attributable to the improvements. Recovery is not based
on the cost of the improvements. Dunham v. Davis, 232 S.C. 175, 101 S.E.2d 278 (1957);
Reaves v. Stone, 231 S.C. 628, 99 S.E.2d 729 (1957). Certainly, inflationary increases are
not recoverable. See Dunham v. Davis, 232 S.C. 175, 101 S.E.2d 278 (1957).
145. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-108 (1975).
146. See notes 91-145 and accompanying text supra.
147. The individual nominated in a will to administer the estate is the executor. T.
ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 5 (2d ed. 1953). See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-
140 (1976).
148. "In case of intestacy the personal representative . . . is called the 'adminis-
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personal representatives' 49-the functions of these individuals
remain essentially the same. Each has sole responsibility for the
administration of the decedent's estate.'50 Each must take posses-
sion of the estate'5' and manage, protect, and preserve it.5" The
UPC makes explicit that which is implicit under present law,
namely, that the representative is a fiduciary'53 holding the estate
in trust for creditors and interested persons.' Thus, the UPC
states that the representative "is under a duty to settle and dis-
tribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms
of any probated and effective will and this Code, and as expedi-
tiously as is consistent with the best interests of the estate."'1
5
trator.'" T. ATKINSON, note 147 supra, at 4-5. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-30 (1976).
An administrator is also appointed when, though the decedent died testate, his will
fails to appoint an executor, or, if he appointed one, the executor fails to qualify or ceases
to act. In this case, an administrator, with the will annexed, is appointed by the court.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-110 (1976). If the executor dies while in office, an administrator
de bonis non, with the will annexed, is appointed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-130 (1976).
He is simply the successor of an executor where the administration of the estate remains
to be completed. See T. ATKINSON, note 147 supra, at 4-5.
149. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(30) (1975). The term includes all estate fiduciar-
ies. d. However, it does not include a trustee. Id. § 1-201(45).
150. See Trimmier v. Thomson, 10 S.C. 164 (1878) (title to personal property of an
intestate decedent passes to the administrator); Lenoir v. Sylvester, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.)
632 (1830) (title to personal property of a testate decedent rests in the executor). As the
administrator or executor has sole title, only he may undertake administration, and only
he may receive letters of appointment. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-50 (1976). Title to real
property, on the other hand, passes directly to the devisees or heirs, as appropriate. Carter
v. Wroten, 187 S.C. 432, 198 S.E. 13 (1938); Satcher v. Grice, 53 S.C. 126, 31 S.E. 3 (1898).
Thus, realty need not go through administration in order to prove title. However, the
executor or administrator may reach real assets for payment of debts and claims. See S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 21-15-920, -1250 (1976). Even in the absence of a statute, the probate court
has the authority to order the sale of land in this situation as part of its general powers
over administration. McNamee v. Waterbury, 4 S.C. 156 (1872).
While title passes to the devisee rather than to the personal representative under the
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975), the assets, including real property, are nevertheless subject
to administration. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-101 (1975). Having been appointed, the
personal representative is under a specific duty to settle and distribute the estate. Id. §
3-703.
151. See Groves v. Spoon, 18 S.C. 386 (1883); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (1975).
However, the personal representative may leave realty or tangible personalty with the
person "presumptively entitled thereto." Id.
152. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-1410 (1976); Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S.C. 396
(1883); UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (1975).
153. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-703 (1975).
154. Id. § 3-711.
155. Id. § 3-703.
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Within this broad framework, the representative or the exec-
utor/administrator under current practice is burdened with few
specific duties. He must file an inventory and appraisement of
the property of the decedent,156 which of course must be supple-
mented if other assets are subsequently discovered." 7 However,
156. Id. § 3-706. The inventory must be filed within three months after the adminis-
trator's or representative's appointment. Id.; S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-320 (1976). The
South Carolina executor must file more quickly, i.e., within one month of his appoint-
ment. Id. Within another month thereafter, the appraisal must be filed. Id. § 21-15-350.
The inventory and appraisement under the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) is not the two
step procedure presently provided for. Rather, the UPC's inventory must include an
indication of the fair market value of each item listed. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-706
(1975). It must also include an indication of the type and amount of encumbrances on
each item of property listed. Id. There is no such requirement under existing state law.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-350 (1976).
The personal representative under the UPC may employ such appraisers as he deems
appropriate to assist him in determining the valuation of estate assets. The determination
of whether to hire such an appraiser and which appraiser to hire lies within the discretion
of the representative, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-707 (1975). Quite clearly, the representa-
tive may dispense with the use of appraisers where he feels no need for them. See id. The
South Carolina executor may not do so. Legislation specifically provides for the appoint-
ment of three or more appraisers, whether needed or not. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-340
(1976). If property is located in more than one county, appraisers must be appointed in
each county. Id. § 21-15-360.
Probably the only reason for retaining the appraisal system is to set asset values for
estate tax purposes. Unfortunately, the valuation resulting from the appraisal is not
conclusive for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Service and further unofficial apprais-
als may be necessary. See I.R.C. § 2031; Trees. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 C.B.
368. In Estate of M.S. Pridmore, 20 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 47 (1961), the valuation of the
probate court's appraisers was not followed because none of the appraisers were called to
testify. If the appraisers are qualified experts, the Internal Revenue Service may accept
their valuation. See id. However, there is no requirement that the probate court appoint
experts. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-340 (1976). Further, with the greatly expanded
exemption equivalent for federal estate tax reporting purposes, the need for an appraisal
in every case is wanting. See I.R.C. § 6018. A return is now required only if the gross estate
is greater than $120,000. Id. By 1981, this figure will rise to $175,000. Id. The UPC
procedure is preferable in that it leaves the determination as to the necessity of appraisals
with the representative.
157. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-708 (1975). The requirement that an executor or
administrator file a supplemental report is not explicit. If a primary purpose of appraisal
is taxation, it is clear that the tax commission must be notified of later discovered assets,
and, since it is notified initially by inventory and appraisement, it follows that notification
of additional assets should be in the same manner. This is confirmed by the requirement
that the appraisal be on a form prescribed by the South Carolina Tax Commission. S.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-15-350 (1976). Further, since title to personalty passes to the estate
fiduciary, administration is necessary to pass title to the proper recipient, Lenoir v.
Sylvester, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 632, 633 (1830), and an inventory is an essential part of the
administration, S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-370 (1976); it follows that a supplemental inven-
tory is necessary. Certainly, this is true in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2113.69 (Page 1976).
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unlike the executor and administrator under current law,' 8 the
UPC's representative need not make accountings to the court.'59
Relief from accounting to the court signifies the fundamental
philosophical difference between the UPC and present law,
namely, the necessity for supervision of the estate fiduciary.
Clearly, the current requirement for accounting is a product of a
perceived need for the state, through the court, to take steps to
insure that the executor or administrator does not defraud credi-
tors or estate beneficiaries.'60 The UPC's premise is just the op-
posite. It assumes that the representative will not act negligently
or fraudulently and, if he should, that the estate claimants, credi-
tors, and devisees' 6' have sufficient means of protecting them-
selves.'62 It supposes that he will act voluntarily in conjunction
with the beneficiaries and others interested in the estate to do
properly that which needs to be done.' 3 Supervision by the court
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-1410 (1976). The initial account is due five months after
the executor's or administrator's appointment and every six months thereafter. Id. How-
ever, upon approved petition, the period for the initial account may be extended to 11
months and annually thereafter. Id. § 21-15-1420.
159. The representative must account to heirs and devisees as part of closing the
estate. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-1001 to -1003 (1975). In formal closings, the account-
ing may be approved by the court, but it will not do so unless requested. Id. §§ 3-1001, -
1002. Only the supervised representative must account to the court. See id. §§ 3-504, -
505.
160. See Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2
CONN. L. REv. 453, 467-70 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-1410 (1976) ("[E]xecutors or
administrators shall file with the probate judge a verified statement of all liabilities of the
estate and the probate judge shall pass upon and determine whether such claims are true
and just liabilities. . . .") (emphasis added).
161. "Devisee" is defined by the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) as "any person desig-
nated in the will to receive a devise." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(8) (1975). A devise
means any testamentary disposition of real or personal property. Id. § 1-201(7). Hence,
the UPC draws no distinction between recipients of real or personal property. All are
referred to as devisees.
162. The claimants, creditors, and devisees of the estate are entitled to: (1) notice of
informal probate, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-306, -310, -705 (1975); (2) a copy of the
inventory, if requested, id. § 3-706; and (3) an accounting as part of the estate closing
procedure, id. §§ 3-1001 to -1003. They may, at any time, request the court to supervise
the representative. Id. § 3-502. Without engaging in that procedure, they may petition to
have the representative restrained from exercising his office or any specified act of admin-
istration, disbursement or distribution of the estate. Id. § 3-607. Finally, they may petition
for his removal. Id. § 3-611. Because administration is normally a family matter and the
beneficiaries have ample notice and opportunity to protect their interests, there is no need
for the court to intervene unless asked to do so. Hence, the representative is directed by
the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) to proceed with the expeditious settlement and admin-
istration of the estate without court order. Id. § 3-704.
163. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, Art. III, General Comment (1975); note 162 supra.
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is deemed to be unnecessary." 4
This is not to say that there may never be a need for action
or supervision by the court. The UPC recognizes and provides for
those situations where disputes between the representative and
the devisees or creditors might arise or where the representative
or an interested party believes that instructions as to some facet
of the administration are necessary. In these cases, any interested
party may move for the court to settle the dispute, declare rights,
or make any other appropriate order.' 5 However, until requested
to act, the court has no authority, for it may not supervise or
demand reports of the representative on its own initiative.' Its
role is strictly passive."17 That, of course, is not true of the present
probate court."'
164. Notes 162 & 163 and accompanying text supra. If the representative does exer-
cise his powers and authority improperly, he will breach his duties to the estate beneficiar-
ies and creditors. For such conduct, he may be liable for any loss resulting from the breach
of his fiduciary duties. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-712 (1975).
165. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-105 (1975). The representative may also petition the
court for such an order. Id. § 3-704. This may be described as an in-and-out procedure
and it is thought of as occupying some middle ground between unsupervised and super-
vised administration. See notes 169-76 and accompanying text infra. However, it occupies
no middle ground, as none exists. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) provides for either
supervised or unsupervised administration. The in-and-out procedure is available in order
for either the representative or interested parties to bring before the court a particular
question for expeditious determination. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-105, -190, -704
(1975). These questions may arise under either form of administration. Except for ques-
tions of distribution and as specifically limited by court order, the power and authority
of the representative are the same regardless of the type of administration being utilized.
Id. § 3-501. Thus, the right of the representative and interested persons to seek resolution
of specific questions or disputes has no effect on the status of the representative. If
unsupervised, he remains so. If supervised, he remains so. See id. §§ 3-105, -501, -704.
166. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-105, -501, -704 (1975). The UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE (1975) has but one provision by which the court may invoke its jurisdiction itself.
Where supervised administration has been ordered, the representative is "responsible to
the Court . . . and is subject to directions concerning the estate made by the Court on
its own motion or on the motion of any interested party." Id. § 3-501. However, the court
cannot on its own initiative order supervised administration. This must be invoked by an
interested party. Id. § 3-502.
167. Note 166 and accompanying text supra. See generally Wellman, The Uniform
Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453, 486-93 (1970);
Wellman & Gordon, The Uniform Probate Code: Article HI Analyzed in Relation to
Changes in the First Nine Enactments, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 477, 499.
168. Thus, an executor must file accountings, S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-1410 (1976),
and he must obtain an order for the sale of personal property, in addition to real property,
unless authorized to do so by the will. Id. §§ 21-15-1250, -1270. A representative under
the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975), in contrast, may sell both personal and real property
unless restricted by the will or by an order in a formal proceeding. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
§ 3-715 (1975). The heirs and devisees, if they object, may petition to restrain the repre-
sentative. Id. § 3-607.
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The UPC also recognizes that there may be instances, hope-
fully rare, where because of the inexperience of the representa-
tive, continuous supervision of the representative by the court is
desired. ' The court, thus, may order supervised administra-
tion.'70 This is a continuous procedure entailing formal probate
17'
and a formal closing of the estate.7 2 The representative may not
distribute any part of the estate without the prior approval of the
court upon a hearing with full notice to all concerned parties.'
7 3
In the meantime, he may hold and exercise authority over estate
assets in the same manner as an unsupervised representative.''
4
The representative's authority, upon proper request, may be cur-
tailed in any appropriate manner during administration.'7  How-
ever, these restrictions must be endorsed on the representative's
letters of appointment to be valid against third persons.'
76
Clearly, continuous supervision is not consistent with the
basic underpinnings of the UPC,77 and it is not the favored form
of administration.7 It must be expressly sought.'79 Continuous
169. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-501 to -505 (1975).
170, Id. § 3-501.
171. Id. § 3-502.
172. Id. § 3-505.
173, Id. § 3-504.
174, Id. § 3-501.
175, Id. § 3-504, Comment.
176, Id. Restriction by endorsement is required to put the world on notice of limita-
tions on the personal representative's authority. Normally, persons transacting business
with a representative are not required to inquire as to the extent of his authority nor are
they bound by testamentary or judicial limitations unless they are aware of such limita-
tions. Nevertheless, it may reasonably be expected that, in exercising ordinary prudence,
they will require the representative to confirm that he is what he purports to be. Any
restrictions are effectively made known to the business world because such restrictions
must be endorsed on the letters. Id. § 3-504. The letters of appointment, in this respect,
resemble a certificate of title to an automobile. Unless a lien is noted on the certificate,
the auto may be sold to a bona fide purchaser. Likewise, unless the restriction on the
representative's authority is noted on his letters, an innocent third person is protected if
the representative treats the estate property in a manner inconsistent with the restric-
tions.
177. See notes 160 & 162-64 and accompanying text supra.
178. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) requires that the request for supervision meet
one of several requirements before such supervision will be ordered:
1) The decedent's will directs supervised administration and there is no change
in circumstances since the execution of the will that would make supervision
unnecessary;
2) supervision is necessary for the protection of persons interested in the estate;
or
3) supervision is deemed necessary by the court.
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-502 (1975). Thus, the normal situation contemplated by the
UPC is one without supervision. See id. § 3-501, Comment; id. § 3-502, Comment.
179. Id. § 3-502.
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supervision is not initiated by an application for formal proceed-
ings80 nor by resort to the court for settlement of disputes or
declaration of rights. 8' In other words, it cannot be triggered
unintentionally.' Since supervised administration is so involved
and since a more expeditious method of administering the estate
is provided, its use should be rare. However he operates, whether
supervised or not, the representative, unlike his South Carolina
counterpart,8 3 has substantial authority over the estate.'84 In-
deed, he may treat the assets as the decedent would have, sub-
ject "' to his fiduciary obligations, 88 which include payment of
debts' 87 and taxes. 88
Creditors must be given notice of a need to file their claims
against the estate. 89 They may file directly with the representa-
180. See id. §§ 3-107, -401 to -414, -502. If only a formal testacy proceeding is initi-
ated, the determination thereof and the appointment of a representative terminate the
court's involvement in the administration as, the representative, unless restricted, pro-
ceeds without orders of the court. Id. § 3-704. See generally id. § 3-501, Comment.
181. See id. § 3-107; note 179 and accompanying text supra.
182. See UNIFORM PROrATE CODE § 3-502 (1975).
183. For example, the executor or administrator may not sell real or personal property
of the decedent without either testamentary authority or court order. S.C. CODE ANN. §§
21-15-920, -1210, -1250, -1270 (1976). See generally Means, Estate Planning and the Law
of Wills and Inheritance for South Carolina Farmers, 12 S.C.L.Q. 491, 553-54 (1960). Cf.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-11-10 to -170 (1976) (relating to the management of investments
and property).
184. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-715 (1975). The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) lists
27 classes of powers which inhere in the representative unless he is otherwise restricted,
providing he acts reasonably in the best interests of the beneficiaries and those others
interested in the estate. These powers include: 1) a general power of sale; 2) the retention
of assets otherwise improper for investment; 3) the satisfaction of charitable pledges even
if nonbinding; 4) making repairs and alterations to buildings; 5) the power to subdivide,
develop, or dedicate land; 6) the power to vote stocks, borrow money with or without
security; 7) the power to compromise claims with estate debtors; and 8) the power to
continue business for four months or, if approved by the court in a formal proceeding with
notice, for a longer period of time. Id. § 3-715. If he fails in his fiduciary duties, he is
liable to any interested person for the resultant loss to the same extent as the trustee of
an express trust would be. Id. § 3-712. Thus, he must exercise his authority as would a
prudent man in dealing with the property of another. Id. § 7-302.
185. Id. § 3-711.
186. Id. The representative is specifically referred to as a fiduciary. Id. § 3-703. He
has the same power over title as would an absolute owner, but such title is in trust for
creditors and others interested in the estate. Id. § 3-711.
187. Id. § 3-711.
188. Id. §§ 3-709, -715(18).
189. Id. § 3-801. Notice is given by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for three successive weeks. Id.
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tive"' or with the court. 9' A creditor need only state the basis of
the claim, his name and address, and the amount claimed. 9 2 If
the claim is contingent, the nature of the contingency must be
noted,'93 and, if secured, the security must be described.'94 The
statement of claim need not be attested.1
95
Claims must be filed within four months of notice, or if no
notice was given, within three years of the decedent's death."'
Failure to file bars the claim, not only against the estate, but also
against heirs and devisees."17 The representative may pay the
claim whenever he deems it appropriate."' Further, he may com-





195. Id. § 1-310.
196. Id. §§ 3-803(a)(1), (2).
197. Id. § 3-803(b).
198. Id. § 3-807(b). This assumes that the claim has not been disallowed. Disallow-
ance of a claim requires a positive action of the representative by mailing notice of
disallowance within 60 days of the time for original presentation of the claim. If he fails
to mail the notice, the claim is allowed. Id. § 3-806. If the claim is disallowed, the claimant
has 60 days in which to petition the court for allowance or to bring an action against the
representative. If the claimant does not follow this procedure, his claim is barred. Id.
The representative is not given any time limit within which he must give notice of
his appointment. However, his failure to provide prompt notice would be a breach of his
fiduciary obligations, subjecting him to liability should a claimant later assert a claim
against a devisee. The representative would be liable for the costs related to the discharge
of the claim and the recovery of contributions from others. Id, § 3-801, Comment. See id.
§§ 3-801, -712. This situation will not arise if the probate court handles publication, as it
does in some locations, as a convenience to representatives.
In contrast, a South Carolina executor or administrator must file with the court an
affidavit that he has fulfilled the publication requirement of advertisement once a week
for three consecutive weeks, and he must begin the advertisements within 30 days of his
appointment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-630 (1976).
Under the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975), creditors are barred completely if they do
not timely file. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-803 (1975). This is not true under present South
Carolina law. Creditors are barred against the estate if they do not file claims within five
months of the first pubication of notice of appointment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-640
(1976). From its language, the statute is appparently a complete bar to the later assertion
of claims against the heirs and distributees of the decedent. Id. See Means, Estate Plan-
ning and the Law of Wills and Inheritance for South Carolina Farmers, 12 S.C.L.Q. 491,
552 (1960). Nevertheless, at least two federal cases have held otherwise. Dubuque Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 213 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1954); Muckenfuss v. Marchant, 105 F.2d
469 (4th Cir. 1939). The late Professor Coleman Karesh disagreed. Karesh, Survival of
Actions-Filing of Claims-Parties, 8 S.C.L.Q. 162 (1955). In any event, there are no cases
from the South Carolina Supreme Court on the issue.
The South Carolina statutes have no provision allowing for the early payment of
claims, However, like the representative under the UPC, the executor or administrator
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promise it, if such appears to be in the best interest of the es-
tate. "'99 Of course, if he pays prematurely, and the estate ulti-
mately turns out to be inadequate to discharge all claims, or if
he improperly compromises the claim, he may be held personally
liable. 10
C. Distribution and Closing of Estates
The UPC takes a fundamentally different approach to devo-
lution of title to the decedent's property than does present South
Carolina law, at least with respect to personal property. Pres-
ently, real property is said to pass directly to the decedent's devi-
sees201 or, in the absence of an effective testamentary gift, to his
heirs. 22 Personal property, however, passes to the executor or
administrator and not to the legatees or distributees. 213 Thus,
while administration is not necessary to pass title to realty from
the decedent, administration is essential for title to personalty to
pass to legatees. 24
Under the UPC, administration is not necessary to pass title
to any property, whether real or personal, as title passes to the
persons entitled thereto upon the decedent's death.2 15 All prop-
erty, of course, is subject to administration, but this is not a title-
perfecting process.
20 6
may compromise claims with the consent of the probate judge. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-
720 (1976).
199. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-813 (1975).
200. Id. § 3-807(b)(2), -712.
201. Carter v. Wroten, 187 S.C. 432, 435, 198 S.E. 13, 15 (1938); Satcher v. Grice, 53
S.C. 126, 128, 31 S.E. 3, 4 (1898).
202. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-3-20 (1976).
203. Trimmier v. Thomson, 10 S.C. 164, 182 (1877); Lenoir v. Sylvester, 17 S.C.L. (1
Bail.) 632, 633 (1830).
204. See Richardson v. Cooley, 20 S.C. 347, 350 (1884); Lenoir v. Sylvester, 17 S.C.L.
(1 Bail.) 632, 633 (1830).
205. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-101 (1975). Title is not entirely clear, however, since
the property is subject to the homestead allowance, to exempt property and family allow-
ances, to creditor's claims, to the elective right of the surviving spouse, and to administra-
tion. Id. Ordinarily, to insure that these claims are satisfied, the representative will take
possession of the property, though he need not do so if he thinks it unnecessary. Id. § 3-
709.
206. See id. §§ 3-101, -901. Of course, administration serves to confirm title and to
make it marketable. Thus, if distribution is made in kind, the representative shall execute
a deed of distribution. Id. § 3-907. That deed is conclusive evidence that the distributee
has succeeded to the interests of the estate in the particular property. Id. § 3-908. If the
distribution was improper, the representative may recover the assets or their value. Id.
Nevertheless, the distributee may pass good title to a purchaser. Id. § 3-910.
1978]
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For example, if probate proceedings are not instituted within
three years of death, intestacy is conclusively established,0 7 as no
will may thereafter be probated.0 8 The heirs, having presumably
gone into possession, are protected in their title despite the ab-
sence of administration." ' Similarly, if a will was offered for pro-
bate and proven but no administration was conducted, the devi-
sees who entered under the will are protected in their title. 20 In
the rare situations where devisees enter under a will which was
not offered for probate, they, too, receive some protection. They
may, after the three year period for probate has run, offer the will
as evidence of their title to the claimed estate.211 Title is not
established thereby; that can be done only by a validly probated
document. t 2 However, the will might, for example, help support
a claim of adverse possession against the heirs, 21  and it does
represent a form of color of title.21 1 Problems of this sort are not
common. Probate and administration are the rule rather than the
exception, and either probate itself1 5 or the representative's dis-
tribution establishes title.218 This results in no change from cur-
207. See id. § 3-108; id., Comment.
208. Id. § 3-108. However, a will which was probated in the informal proceeding may
still be contested for up to another year since a formal proceeding may be instituted at
any time within three years after death or 12 months after informal probate, whichever is
later. Id. However, no new will may be offered after three years of death. Id.
209. See id. §§ 3-101, -108, -109; id. § 3-108, Comment. The heirs must establish the
decedent's ownership of the property, his death, and their relationship to him in order to
establish their title. Id. § 3-108; id., Comment. Of course, they take subject to the claims
for allowances and the claims of creditors. Id. §§ 3-101, -108..See also id. § 3-104.
210. Id. §§ 3-101, -901. In this situation, the devisees rely on the probated will to
establish their title. Id. § 3-901. As is the case with taking by heirs, the title of the devisees
is subject to the claims for allowances and the claims of creditors. Id.; id. § 3-101. See
also id. § 3-104.
211. Id. § 3-102; id., Comment. This situation might arise where a surviving spouse
pays all the claims herself and does not admit the will to probate under the belief that it
will add nothing to her rights. She may mistakenly think she is entitled to the whole of
her decedent husband's estate when in fact she is not. Similarly, she might have been
fraudulently induced into believing probate was unnecessary.
212. Id. § 3-102.
213. In the absence of a will, the heirs are entitled to the property. Id. §§ 3-101,
.901. If the widow enters under an unprobated will, she does so against the interests of
the heirs, and they may bring an action for the recovery of the land. S.C. CODIi ANN. §
15-3-340 (1976).
214. See S.C. CoDE ANN. § 15-67-210, -220 (1976). The right to offer the will as
evidence becomes important if the heirs wait more than 10 years to record the property
because it supplies the element of adversity. Id. § 15-67-220.
215. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-102, -901 (1975).
216. Id. § 3-907.
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Ordinarily, the representative will have taken possession of
the decedent's personal property.1 ' He may begin distribution at
such time as he, in conformity with his obligations as a fidu-
ciary " and his obligation to pay death taxes,2 finds appropri-
ate.22' Presumably, under this standard, in a proper situation he
may begin distribution in less than six months from his appoint-
ment;22 under present South Carolina law he could not do So.
2 2 3
The representative may and normally would distribute in
kind rather than converting assets to cash.24 He, of course, may
distribute to a trustee.m He must abide by any agreements con-
cerning distribution that are entered into by all of the successors
to the decedent's property, even though the agreements may alter
the terms of the will or deviate from the statute of distribution.
22 6
Consistent with the UPC's provisions allowing a choice be-
tween informal or formal proceedings, the representative may
elect to close the estate informally by affidavit2 or formally by
petitioning for an order of settlement and termination of his ap-
pointment.2 28 In contrast, a South Carolina fiduciary has no
choice. Informal discharge is unavailable.29
When the representative closes informally by affidavit, he
affirms that he has properly completed the administration of the
estate, that all claims and expenses have been paid, and that the
217. See notes 201-04 and accompanying text supra.
218. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-709 (1975). The representative may leave real or
personal property with any person "presumptively entitled thereto" unless he will need it
to complete the administration. Id.
219. See notes 152 & 153 and accompanying text supra.
220. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-715(18), -709 (1975).
221. See id. §§ 3-709, -906.
222. However, he may not close the estate before six months have elapsed since his
appointment. Id. § 3-1003.
223. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-15-1630 (1976).
224. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-906 (1975). Presumably, a South Carolina executor
would also distribute in kind as there is no statutory or case law prohibiting his doing so.
Inferentially, there is authority for his doing so where a will so directs. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 21-15-1760 (1976).
225. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-913 (1975). A South Carolina executor may also
distribute to a trustee. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-33-20 (1976). Cf. id. § 21-29-40 (prohibiting
foreign corporations domiciled or licensed to do business in a state contiguous to South
Carolina from serving as testamentary trustee).
226. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-912 (1975).
227. Id. § 3-1003.
228. Id. §§ 3-1001, -1002.
229. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-23-350 (1976).
1978] 429
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assets have been distributed to those entitled thereto. 0 He must
provide a copy of his affidavit and an accounting of his adminis-
tration to all distributees. 23' They then have six months in which
to assert claims of malfeasance or be barred. 2 2 The representa-
tive's authority is not terminated,m however, for another six
months, a full year after the affidavit was originally filed.24 Thus,
if assets were discovered during the year following the affidavit,
the representative could administer them without reopening the
estate since it would not have been closed.25
Alternatively, the representative may choose formal closing.
This results in a simultaneous bar of claims against him and
termination of his authority.2 3 As part of the proceedings, the
court may adjudicate testacy,231 may compel an accounting,s
and may approve an accounting previously submitted. 5 As with
all formal proceedings, notice must be given to all devisees,20 and
the court's order is final and conclusive unless appealed.' The
formal proceeding is an adjudicative proceeding by which the
representative may be discharged from further claims of devi-
sees.
2 42
230. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1003 (1975).
231. Id.
232. Id. § 3-1005. The bar does not apply to actions for fraud, misrepresentation, or
inadequate disclosure. Id. In such cases, the action may be brought within two years after
discovery of the fraud, but not later than five years after its commission. Id. § 1-106.
233. The term "terminated" refers to the cessation of the authority to act rather than
to the possibility of liability to interested persons. Id. § 3-1003, Comment. Thus, his
authority may be terminated by his removal, see id. § 3-611, while his liability for breach
of his fiduciary duties remains until applicable limitations have become effective. Id. §
3-1003, Comment.
234. Id. § 3-1003(b).
235. See note 233 supra.
236. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-1001, -1002 (1975).
237. Id. § 3-1001. It is not necessary that the court adjudicate this matter, however.
Id. § 3-1002. Thus, an estate could be opened informally, id. §§ 3-201 to -311, and closed
formally, id. § 3-1002. Because it does include a final discharge of the representative, id.,
this may prove an attractive method of estate administration to corporate fiduciaries.




242. In some respects, the provisions for the discharge of a South Carolina executor
or administrator are similar to that for a formal closing under the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
(1975). He must account and give publication notice for a month of his intent to apply
for the discharge. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-23-350 (1976). The effect of this procedure is to
vacate the office and to discharge the fiduciary, though it is not conclusive of a complete
settlement of the estate. If assets are subsequently discovered, an administrator de bonis
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Formal proceedings are available to all representatives, in-
cluding one appointed informally.24 Similarly, a formally ap-
pointed representative may close informally. 4 However, the op-
tion is not available to a supervised representative;245 he must use
the formal closing as the court approval of distribution is an
inherent feature of supervised administration. 21
IV. THE PROBATE COURT
The UPC would substantially change current South Carolina
probate procedures and practices. Certainly, the character and
structure of the court having supervision of probate would differ
significantly from the present court. In South Carolina, the pro-
bate court is a court of limited jurisdiction, having a mixture of
ministerial and judicial functions. 241 It may admit an estate,
whether testate or intestate, to probate. However, in cases of
contested testacy, its judgment is not conclusive as the circuit
court may hear the entire matter on appeal by a trial de novo.248
The probate court may not remove an executor, though it may
remove an administrator, since the latter is appointed by the
court and serves as its functionary, whereas the former does not.24
non may be appointed. McNair v. Howle, 123 S.C. 252, 116 S.E. 279 (1922). See also note
157 and accompanying text supra.
243. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1001, -1002 (1975). See note 237 supra.
244. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 3-1003 (1975).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 3-501.
247. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-23-510 to -580 (Cum. Supp. 1977). This
legislation established state-wide provisions for probate courts and added provisions that
possibly increase the scope of jurisdiction of these courts. See note 252 and accompanying
text infra.
248. S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-5-10 (1976) established the right to appeal from the judg-
ment of the probate court after probate in due or solemn form. The issues before the circuit
court on appeal are the same issues that were addressed in the probate court. Thus, this
appeal to the circuit court, essentially, is a trial de novo. Johnson v. Johnson, 160 S.C.
158, 158 S.E. 264 (1931).
249. In the traditional analysis of the executor's position, he is thought of as having
been appointed by the testator and not by the court, which merely issues letters testamen-
tary. Hence, as the court did not appoint him, it could not remove him. See Griffith v.
Frazier, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 1 (1814) (appeal from a South Carolina judgment). However,
the legislature has specifically authorized the judge of probate to revoke letters testamen-
tary if the executor fails to make proper returns, though this appears to be different from
a removal from office. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-13-370 (1976). In the instance where the
executor removes from the state, this is statutorily deemed to be a renunciation of his
office. Id. § 21-13-390. However, to the extent that this amounts to removal from office,
it is not the probate court which makes the removal.
This does not mean that the executor is immune to judicial authority in relation to
1978]
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The court has traditionally been thought of as not having general
equitable powers and therefore as being incapable of, for exam-
ple, construing wills.21 However, the recently enacted Judicial
Reform Actsl establishes the jurisdiction of the probate court in
language identical to that of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act,2 2 and this may reasonably be interpreted as extending at
least some equitable jurisdiction to a court that may be and often
is manned by a nonlawyer.2ss Even before this legislation, the
traditional division of authority in probate matters between the
probate courts and the circuit courts was beginning to be ques-
tioned by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In Tucker v.
Tucker, 251 the court said that once the probate court was chosen
his activities. In a proper case, a court of equity may appoint a receiver for the estate and
enjoin the executor from interfering with the receiver. Gadsen v. Whaley, 14 S.C. 210
(1879); Stairley v. Rube, 16 S.C.Eq. (McMul. Eq.) 22 (1840). Though some cases speak
of removing an executor, see, e.g., Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S.C. 396 (1882), there actually
is only an abeyance of the executor's authority while the receiver acts. Even a court of
equity may not technically remove the executor. Gadsen v. Whaley, 14 S.C. 210 (1879).
Whether a probate court is so limited today is unclear. In Tucker v. Tucker, 264 S.C.
172, 213 S.E.2d 588 (1975), the court considered a demurrer interposed to a circuit court
proceeding for the removal of a coexecutor because, it was averred, only the probate court
had jurisdiction to do so since that court had assumed supervision of the estate. The court
held that the demurrer should have been sustained because the forum for the administra-
tion was the probate court. Id. at 177-78, 213 S.E.2d at 590. The significance of this
decision is unknown as yet. It does imply that original actions involving administration
must be brought in the probate court, thereby limiting the circuit court to an appellate
role. Original jurisdiction in the probate court necessarily means it would hear essentially
equitable matters, such as removal of an executor, a jurisdiction heretofore denied to the
probate court. It may be that Tucker will be of little significance for, but a year later, the
court specifically denied the jurisdiction of a probate court to construe a will, a decision
seemingly inconsistent with the Tucker rationale of original probate matters being heard
in the forum of administration. Jackson v. Cannon, 266 S.C. 198, 222 S.E.2d 494 (1976).
Perhaps the answer lies in the distinction between the removal of an executor and the
construction of a will. One deals directly with the essence of administration, traditionally
thought to be within the scope and jurisdiction of the probate court; the other deals with
matters independent of the day to day administration.
An administrator, however, is clearly of a different status. He is appointed by the
probate court, rather than by the decedent, and derives his authority from and is subject
to the court. A probate judge may remove him. Ex parte Small, 69 S.C. 43, 48 S.E. 40
(1903).
250. Jackson v. Cannon, 266 S.C. 198, 222 S.E.2d 494 (1976) ("Probate Court does
not have jurisdiction to interpret the terms of a will or pass upon the validity of clauses
of a will."). See also Karesh, Probate Court Jurisdiction over Testamentary Trusts, 2
S.C.L.Q. 13 (1949); note 249 supra.
251. 1976 S.C. Acts 1859.
252. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-53-20 (1976) with S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-23-580(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1977).
253. See id. § 14-23-30 (1976).
254. 264 S.C. 172, 213 S.E.2d 588 (1975).
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as the forum of administration, that court was the proper forum
initially to hear estate matters traditionally thought to be with-
out its jurisdiction, e.g., the removal of an executor. 2s
Whatever questions may exist, they would be laid to rest by
the adoption of the UPC, for, in the UPC's contemplation, the
probate court, whatever it may be called, would have plenary and
exclusive jurisdiction over all matters relating to admission of the
estate to probate, administration of the estate, and, finally, dis-
tribution of the estate's assets. 26 In addition, the probate court
would have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of other civil courts, over
all matters concerning inter vivos as well as testamentary
trusts.27 As a result of the probate court's broad jurisdiction, the
questions which the court generally will be called upon to resolve
will require legally trained individuals, and thus the judge of the
court under the UPC will be an attorney.2ss If the' present court
were reconstituted as the UPC court, a nonattorney incumbent
could continue in office and, in addition, could seek re-election
as judge.2ss This, naturally, would result in a nonattorney exercis-
ing significant legal and equitable functions normally only al-
lowed to judges with legal training. Attrition would resolve the
255. Id. The court stated:
"While it is true that the circuit court has general jurisdiction in civil matters,
once the forum for administration has been chosen, the forum or court so assum-
ing jurisdiction has control of the administration of the estate and parties inter-
ested in estate matters should apply to the judge of that court."
Id. at 177, 213 S.E.2d at 590. The court apparently interpreted S.C. CONsT. art. V, §§ 7,
8 as establishing the jurisdiction of the probate and circuit courts and interpreted the
implementing statutes as conferring on the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over all
probate matters, thereby relegating the circuit court to an appellate position in all probate
matters. See Tucker v. Tucker, 264 S.C. at 178, 213 S.E.2d at 590. Previously, the circuit
courts had been thought of as having concurrent jurisdiction, if not exclusive jurisdiction,
in basically equitable matters. Indeed, just a year after Tucker, the court reemphasized
that the probate court may not construe a will. Jackson v. Cannon, 266 S.C. 198, 222
S.E.2d 494 (1976). See generally Karesh, Probate Court Jurisdiction over Testamentary
Trusts, 2 S.C.L.Q. 13 (1949). See also note 249 supra.
256. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-302 (1975). The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) spe-
cifically includes the construction of wills and the determination of heirs and successors
within the jurisdiction of the probate court. Id. § 1-302(a).
257. Id. § 1-302(b). The term "trust" is defined as including "any express trust,
private or charitable . . . wherever and however created." Id. § 1-201(45). It excludes
constructive and resulting trusts, as well as other trusts generally considered as nonpro-
bate and custodial arrangements. Id.
258. Id. § 1-309. This provision specifies that the judge of the court have the same
qualifications as circuit judges who, in South Carolina, must be lawyers. S.C. CONST. art.
V, § 11.
259. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 8-101(6) (1975).
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problem in the long run, and, of course, appellate review would
ensure fair treatment of parties in individual cases.
Although the probate court that the UPC envisions would
have greater jurisdiction than does the present court, there is no
reason to expect that in its general day-to-day nonjudicial opera-
tions, such as informal probate and receipt of inventories, it will
function much differently from the present court. These primar-
ily ministerial functions will be fulfilled by a nonjudicial officer,
the registrar, rather than by the judge of probate.6 0 Indeed, the
responsibilities assigned to the registrar are much like those
which South Carolina probate judges now perform. 2 1 However,
unlike present judges who may hear an action for probate in
solemn form, for example, the registrar would have no judicial or
formal duties. He would be purely an administrative official while
the judge of probate would essentially concern himself with the
judicial functions of the office, e.g., formal probate, will construc-
tion, and supervision of fiduciaries.
There are at least three ways in which the UPC's objectives
might be realized. District courts of probate might be established,
similar to the present judicial circuits and the newly instituted
family courts. 2 2 Under this plan, the present county probate
judge might be constituted as the registar or clerk of probate for
his county, or alternatively, he might continue to be identified
as the county probate judge. Regardless of the name chosen, he
would perform the functions assigned by the UPC to the registrar,
while the district court of probate entertains judicial matters. A
second method would retain the county probate court system but
260. The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) distinguishes between the registrar, who
makes such nonjudicial adjudications as informal appointments, id. § 3-105, and the
clerk, whose duty it is to maintain records of the court and to issue certified copies of
records upon payment of proper fees, id. § 1-305. There is no prohibition against the
amalgamation of these functions in one person, and indeed this would seem to be desirable
to estabish clearly the responsibilities for the efficient operation of the court. The author
assumes that the registrar would be superior rather than equal to the clerk and, therefore,
accountable for the clerk's performance. Hence, the registrar is treated as having the
responsibility for all ministerial activities of the court.
261. This includes, for example, the maintenance of record books and the issuance
of certified copies of letters of appointment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-23-570 (1976); UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 1-305 (1975). The UNIFORM PROBATE CODE (1975) does not address the
function of the court with respect to the issuance of marriage licenses, as is now done by
South Carolina probate courts, nor the obligation of present judges to act as clerks of the
court of common pleas in relatively rare situations when the regularly appointed clerk is
disqualified. See S.C. CODE ANN. § § 14-23-55, -570 (1976). It is reasonable to assume these
functions would be added to the duties of the court and the responsibility for their per-
formance would be assigned to the registrar if the UPC were adopted.
262. The family courts were established as part of judicial reform. There are 16
[Vol. 29
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lessen its jurisdiction to some extent. Those acts principally min-
isterial in nature, that is, those assigned by the UPC to the regis-
trar, including informal probate hearings, would continue to be
performed by the county probate judge. Proceedings which are
judicial in nature, e.g., formal probate and formal intestacy pro-
ceedings, will constructions, and requests for instructions, would
be heard originally and exclusively by the appropriate circuit
court as would any other civil matter. A third alternative would
be to increase substantially the jurisdiction of the present probate
court, notwithstanding the potential infirmities which may result
from having a court with a nonattorney judge having the scope
of jurisdiction envisioned by the UPC.13 This plan would elimi-
nate the trial de novo, which now follows probate court determi-
nations,2 16 4 and, in its place, this plan would allow appeals to the
circuit court only on questions of law and not of fact.2 5
The second method theoretically would be the least disrup-
tive of the bench, as the judicial functions exercised by the pro-
bate courts are ultimately heard on appeal de novo by the circuit
court.266 If, however, there are few such appeals taken, the place-
ment of all such actions initially in the circuit courts may result
in an increase in the court docket.2 7 The third alternative would
solve this problem, but would add the problem of having judges
without formal legal training ruling on questions of law of a far
broader nature than they currently do.265 However, by making the
circuit court the court of review only on questions of law, it would
appear that errors could be corrected relatively quickly.
Whatever court structure is finally chosen is truly immaterial
to the accomplishment of the UPC's goals. What is important is
circuits, and for each a family court was created. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-410 (1976).
263. Notes 256-59 and accompanying text supra.
264. S.C. CODE ANN. § 18-5-50 (1976); note 256 supra.
265. This would have the effect of adding an intermediate appellate court on ques-
tions of law in probate matters. The wisdom of this effect remains to be debated. Alterna-
tively, appeals on questions of law could be certified directly to the South Carolina
Supreme Court, similar to the manner in which appeals are now taken from the family
courts. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-435 (1976). The circuit court, thus, would not be in the
chain of appeals. This is the approach taken by the UNIsoR PROBATE CODE (1975).
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-308 (1975).
266. Note 264 supra.
267. There is no requirement that probate judges be lawyers, unlike circuit and
family court judges. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 11 (circuit judges); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-425
(1976) (family court judges).
268. See note 18 supra.
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that a form be chosen that will end duplicative actions and
clearly assign judicial responsibilities so that speedy and efficient
administration may be realized.
V. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Probate Code will be the major force in the
development of American probate law during the next several
years. Indeed, the rapidity with which it has been accepted points
to its being the determinative force in forming probate proce-
dure. '69 Perhaps because of this impetus and as a part thereof,
South Carolina is studying the revision of the current probate
provisions, with the UPC as the focus of the study.
The fundamental question is whether probate reform is
needed in South Carolina. If this question is answered in the
affirmative, as it should be, the question arises as to the utility
of the UPC as the vehicle for achieving the needed reform. The
UPC has much to recommend it. Its language is clear and simple.
It offers an expeditious and simple method of administering dece-
dents' estates. At the same time, this method insures that credi-
tors and those having a beneficial interest in the estate are pro-
tected in their claims. Perhaps of most importance in South Caro-
lina, the UPC would recognize the importance of the surviving
spouse in the family unit and would insure that the spouse receive
a fair share of the wealth. In short, the UPC offers a modem and
equitable system for the inter- and intra-generational transfers
of wealth at death.
269. The Estate Practices Committee of the South Carolina Bar in conjunction with
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